Animal Rights Commentary
February 29, 1996
Nazis and Animal Rights
An ad hominem argument is one in which we attack someone in a personal or
abusive way as a means of discrediting her substantive position. For example,
former Beatle John Lennon was often criticized for endorsing utopian socialism
at the same time that he had amassed great wealth. This is an ad hominem
argument, and it is a logical fallacy. The amount of money that John Lennon had
was absolutely irrelevant to the truth or falsity of what he had to say about
world peace or socialism. The fact that Lennon had money is used to show that
his position on socialism was wrong. But whether Lennon had a lot of money is
absolutely irrelevant to the desirability of socialism as a social, political,
and economic system. The worst that one could say about Lennon in this regard is
that he may have been hypocritical in that he preached a doctrine that he may
not have followed in his personal life. So what? Lennon's personal behavior is
absolutely irrelevant to the merits or lack of merits of socialism.
There is another ad hominem argument that is often used in connection with
those who subscribe to the view that nonhumans ought to be accorded certain
fundamental rights. The argument goes as follows: during the 1930s, the Nazis
passed a number of laws that restricted the use of live animals in biomedical
experiments, or "vivisection" as the practice is known. It is also said that
some Nazis, including Hitler, were vegetarians, but the historical evidence for
this assertion, especially as it relates to Hitler, is questionable. But let us
assume that it is not. Let us assume for a moment that Hitler was a vegetarian.
The Nazi laws against vivisection, and Hitler's supposed vegetarianism, are
offered to show that the animal rights position is wrong. This is a perfect
example of the ad hominem fallacy. And it does not work. Let us consider the
various contexts in which this argument has been raised.
The most common context involves the argument that since Hitler was
supposedly a vegetarian, and since the Nazis restricted vivisection, this
somehow shows that people who believe in animal rights are somehow like Nazis.
The argument goes like this: the Nazis believed that animals had certain rights
but maintained a policy of genocide against certain people. Therefore, those who
subscribe to animal rights are similarly morally tainted. They are like Nazis.
This argument is obviously absurd. Consider the following argument. Stalin
ate meat. Stalin killed over 6 million peasants in his effort to collective
Russia in the 1930s. Therefore, those who eat meat are similarly morally
tainted. But that argument simply does not work. Just because someone eats meat
does not mean that they would endorse the killing of people. They might do so;
they might not. But their eating meat is irrelevant to whether they would
endorse the killing of people. Similarly, the fact that Nazis may have liked
animals but hated humans does not mean that those who subscribe to animal rights
also believe that the killing of Jews or gypsies, or non-Aryans generally, is
OK.
The second context in which this argument is made involves a matter of
historical interest. During the 1930s, the Nazis certainly did show some
interest in protecting animals. It is, of course, rather difficult to argue that
a military force that was destroying half of Europe, including its animal
population, really cared about animals, but I do not dispute that Nazis did pass
fairly progressive measures against vivisection. At the same time that they were
legislating to help animals, however, the Nazis were engineering the killing of
millions of humans. The argument goes: there is something pathological about a
society that cares about animals but not about humans, and even seeks to impose
enormous suffering on at least some humans. Therefore, concern about animals
must be judged against the prevailing treatment of humans, and if the latter is
lesser by comparison, any concern for animal suffering is pathological.
Again, this argument does not work. The fact that some people may favor
nonhumans greater than they do some group of human beings is not peculiar to
Nazi Germany. During the 18th century, many American states passed all sorts of
anticruelty laws involving animals while at the same time human slavery was
legal. It is simply too easy to regard the pathology of Nazi Germany as unique
in this respect. Moreover, in 1996, some people think that even more tax breaks
for the rich should get greater priority than providing the minimal requirements
for a decent and dignified life to disempowered and dispossessed humans. The sad
fact is that humans often favor some other group of humans or animals more than
they do some other human beings. But that says absolutely nothing about whether
animals should have rights; it does say a lot about some people, however.
The third form of this argument is that by regarding animals as having
rights, we "blur" the line between human and non-human, and thus facilitate the
exploitation of humans who become "devalued" in this process. The argument goes:
the Nazis blurred the line between human and nonhuman, and then started
exploiting humans as though they were animals. Again, this argument does not
make sense. When we "blur" the line between human and nonhuman for the purpose
of arguing that animals, like humans, should be regarded as rightholders, we are
seeking to elevate the status of animals so that the mindless violence and death
that we inflict on them will no longer be regarded as morally justified. We are
not using this argument to justify the devaluation of humans, but rather to
increase the moral status of animals. The Nazis may have "blurred" the
human/non-human line for the purpose of promoting violence; Gandhi and others
who advocate vegetarianism as a means of reducing overall violence "blurred" the
human/non-human line as a means of promoting peace. The use that one makes out
of "blurring" the human/non-human line depends on the political motivation and
morality of the person doing the "blurring," but there is nothing inherent in
this enterprise that would necessarily support a violent use over a peaceful
use.
Ad hominem arguments abound in modern discourse. Whether Pat Buchanan owns a
foreign car has nothing to do with the truth or falsity or other virtues of
Buchanan's trade policies. If Buchanan's trade policies are sound, then his
ownership of a foreign car might allow us to call him a hypocrite, but this
personal observation about Buchanan is completely unrelated to the merits or
lack of merits of his position on trade. Similarly, if Clarence Thomas opposes
affirmative action, we might well call him a hypocrite as he is a beneficiary of
that doctrine. But Thomas's views on affirmative action must stand or fall on
their own merits, and are not determined by whether Clarence Thomas is
consistent in his views. Whether animals have rights is a matter that must stand
or fall on its own merits. The most that we can conclude from any observations
about the Nazis is that people who seem to like animals somewhat can be really
terrible to human beings. So what? Many of those who eat meat and do not like
animals may also act horribly to human beings. But the merits of the arguments
in favor of animal rights are unrelated to the personal habits of those who
espouse--or dispute--that animals have rights.
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