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Philosophy >
General AR Philosophy
Animals and
Ethics
Scott Wilson
Department of Philosophy
University of California, Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
The issue of animals and ethics is a
philosophical issue mainly due to the fact that common sense
thinking is deeply divided on it. Animals exist on the
borderline of our moral concepts; the result is that we
sometimes find ourselves according them a strong moral status,
while at others denying them any kind of moral status at all.
For example, public outrage is strong when knowledge of such
operations as puppy mills is made available; the thought here
is that dogs deserve much more consideration than the
operators of such places give them. However, when it is
pointed out that the conditions in a factory farm are as bad
as, if not much worse than, the conditions in a puppy mill,
the usual response is that those affected are "just animals"
after all, and do not merit our concern. This disparity of
thought gives rise to a philosophical question: what place
should animals have in an acceptable moral system?
Table of Contents
(Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of
this article)
1. Indirect
Theories
On indirect theories, animals do not warrant our moral
concern on their own, but may warrant concern only in so far
as they are appropriately related to human beings. The various
kinds of indirect theories to be discussed are
Worldview/Religious Theories, Kantian Theories, Cartesian
Theories, and Contractualist Theories. The implications these
sorts of theories have for the proper treatment of animals
will be explored after that. Finally, two common methods of
arguing against indirect theories will be
discussed.
a. Worldview/Religious Theories
Some philosophers deny that animals warrant direct moral
concern due to religious or philosophical theories of the
nature of the world and the proper place of its inhabitants.
One of the earliest and clearest expressions of this kind of
view comes to us from Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.). According to
Aristotle, there is a natural hierarchy of living beings. The
different levels are determined by the abilities present in
the beings due to their natures. While plants, animals, and
human beings are all capable of taking in nutrition and
growing, only animals and human beings are capable of
conscious experience. This means that plants, being inferior
to animals and human beings, have the function of serving the
needs of animals and human beings. Likewise, human beings are
superior to animals because human beings have the capacity for
using reason to guide their conduct, while animals lack this
ability and must instead rely on instinct. It follows,
therefore, that the function of animals is to serve the needs
of human beings. This, according to Aristotle, is "natural and
expedient" (Regan and Singer, 1989: 4-5).
Following Aristotle, the Christian philosopher St. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274) argues that since only beings that are
rational are capable of determining their actions, they are
the only beings towards which we should extend concern "for
their own sakes" (Regan and Singer, 1989: 6-12). Aquinas
believes that if a being cannot direct its own actions then
others must do so; these sorts of beings are merely
instruments. Instruments exist for the sake of people that use
them, not for their own sake. Since animals cannot direct
their own actions, they are merely instruments and exist for
the sake of the human beings that direct their actions.
Aquinas believes that his view follows from the fact that God
is the last end of the universe, and that it is only by using
the human intellect that one can gain knowledge and
understanding of God. Since only human beings are capable of
achieving this final end, all other beings exist for the sake
of human beings and their achievement of this final end of the
universe.
Remnants of these sorts of views remain in justifications
for discounting the interests of animals on the basis of the
food chain. On this line of thought, if one kind of being
regularly eats another kind of being, then the first is said
to be higher on the food chain. If one being is higher than
another on the food chain, then it is natural for that being
to use the other in the furtherance of its interests. Since
this sort of behavior is natural, it does not require any
further moral justification.
b. Kantian Theories
Closely related to Worldview/Religious theories are
theories such as Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804). Kant developed a
highly influential moral theory according to which autonomy is
a necessary property to be the kind of being whose interests
are to count direclty in the moral assessment of actions
(Kant, 1983, 1956). According to Kant, morally permissible
actions are those actions that could be willed by all rational
individuals in the circumstances. The important part of his
conception for the moral status of animals is his reliance on
the notion of willing. While both animals and human
beings have desires that can compel them to action, only human
beings are capable of standing back from their desires and
choosing which course of action to take. This ability is
manifested by our wills. Since animals lack this ability, they
lack a will, and therefore are not autonomous. According to
Kant, the only thing with any intrinsic value is a good will.
Since animals have no wills at all, they cannot have good
wills; they therefore do not have any intrinsic value.
Kant's theory goes beyond the Worldview/Religious theories
by relying on more general philosophical arguments about the
nature of morality. Rather than simply relying on the fact
that it is "natural" for rational and autonomous beings to use
non-rational beings as they see fit, Kant instead provides an
argument for the relevance of rationality and autonomy. A
theory is a Kantian theory, then, if it provides an account of
the properties that human beings have and animals lack that
warrants our according human beings a very strong moral status
while denying animals any kind of moral status at all. Kant's
own theory focused on the value of autonomy; other Kantian
theories focus on such properties as being a moral agent,
being able to exist in a reciprocal relation with other human
beings, being able to speak, or being self-aware.
c. Cartesian Theories
Another reason to deny that animals deserve direct concern
arises from the belief that animals are not conscious, and
therefore have no interests or well-being to take into
consideration when considering the effects of our actions.
Someone that holds this position might agree that if
animals were conscious then we would be required to consider
their interests to be directly relevant to the assessment of
actions that affect them. However, since they lack a welfare,
there is nothing to take directly into account when
acting.
One of the clearest and most forceful denials of animal
consciousness is developed by Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who
argues that animals are automata that might act as if they are
conscious, but really are not so (Regan and Singer, 1989:
13-19). Writing during the time when a mechanistic view of the
natural world was replacing the Aristotelian conception,
Descartes believed that all of animal behavior could be
explained in purely mechanistic terms, and that no reference
to conscious episodes was required for such an explanation.
Relying on the principle of parsimony in scientific
explanation (commonly referred to as Occam's Razor) Descartes
preferred to explain animal behavior by relying on the
simplest possible explanation of their behavior. Since it is
possible to explain animal behavior without reference to inner
episodes of awareness, doing so is simpler than relying on the
assumption that animals are conscious, and is therefore the
preferred explanation.
Descartes anticipates the response that his reasoning, if
applicable to animal behavior, should apply equally well to
human behavior. The mechanistic explanation of behavior does
not apply to human beings, according to Descartes, for two
reasons. First, human beings are capable of complex and novel
behavior. This behavior is not the result of simple responses
to stimuli, but is instead the result of our reasoning about
the world as we perceive it. Second, human beings are capable
of the kind of speech that expresses thoughts. Descartes was
aware that some animals make sounds that might be thought to
constitute speech, such as a parrot's "request" for food, but
argued that these utterances are mere mechanically induced
behaviors. Only human beings can engage in the kind of speech
that is spontaneous and expresses thoughts.
Descartes' position on these matters was largely influenced
by his philosophy of mind and ontology. According to
Descartes, there are two mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive kinds of entities or properties: material or
physical entities on the one hand, and mental entities on the
other. Although all people are closely associated with
physical bodies, they are not identical with their bodies.
Rather, they are identical with their souls, or the
immaterial, mental substance that constitutes their
consciousness. Descartes believed that both the complexity of
human behavior and human speech requires the positing of such
an immaterial substance in order to be explained. However,
animal behavior does not require this kind of assumption;
besides, Descartes argued, "it is more probable that worms and
flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all
have immortal souls" (Regan and Singer, 1989: 18).
More recently, arguments against animal consciousness have
been resurfacing. One method of arguing against the claim that
animals are conscious is to point to the flaws of arguments
purporting to claim that animals are conscious. For example,
Peter Harrison has recently argued that the Argument from
Analogy, one of the most common arguments for the claim that
animals are conscious, is hopelessly flawed (Harrison, 1991).
The Argument from Analogy relies on the similarities between
animals and human beings in order to support the claim that
animals are conscious. The similarities usually cited by
proponents of this argument are similarities in behavior,
similarities in physical structures, and similarities in
relative positions on the evolutionary scale. In other words,
both human beings and animals respond in the same way when
confronted with "pain stimuli"; both animals and human beings
have brains, nerves, neurons, endorphins, and other
structures; and both human beings and animals are relatively
close to each other on the evolutionary scale. Since they are
similar to each other in these ways, we have good reason to
believe that animals are conscious, just as are human
beings.
Harrison attacks these points one by one. He points out
that so-called pain-behavior is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the experience of pain. It is not necessary
because the best policy in some instances might be to not show
that you are in pain. It is not sufficient since amoebas
engage in pain behavior, but we do not believe that they can
feel pain. Likewise, we could easily program robots to engage
in pain-behavior, but we would not conclude that they feel
pain. The similarity of animal and human physical structures
is inconclusive because we have no idea how, or even if, the
physical structure of human beings gives rise to experiences
in the first place. Evolutionary considerations are not
conclusive either, because it is only pain behavior, and not
the experience of pain itself, that would be advantageous in
the struggle for survival. Harrison concludes that since the
strongest argument for the claim that animals are conscious
fails, we should not believe that they are conscious.
Peter Carruthers has suggested that there is another reason
to doubt that animals are conscious Carruthers, 1989, 1992).
Carruthers begins by noting that not all human experiences are
conscious experiences. For example, I may be thinking of an
upcoming conference while driving and not ever consciously
"see" the truck in the road that I swerve to avoid. Likewise,
patients that suffer from "blindsight" in part of their visual
field have no conscious experience of seeing anything in that
part of the field. However, there must be some kind of
experience in both of these cases since I did swerve to avoid
the truck, and must have "seen" it, and because blindsight
patients can catch objects that are thrown at them in the
blindsighted area with a relatively high frequency. Carruthers
then notes that the difference between conscious and
non-conscious experiences is that conscious experiences are
available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious
experiences are not. (A higher-order thought is a thought that
can take as its object another thought.) He thus concludes
that in order to have conscious experiences one must be able
to have higher-order thoughts. However, we have no reason to
believe that animals have higher-order thoughts, and thus no
reason to believe that they are conscious.
d. Contractualist Theories
Contractualist Theories of morality construe morality to be
the set of rules that rational individuals would choose under
certain specified conditions to govern their behavior in
society. These theories have had a long and varied history;
however, the relationship between contractualism and animals
was not really explored until after John Rawls published his
A Theory of Justice. In that work, Rawls argues for a
conception of justice as fairness. Arguing against Utilitarian
theories of justice, Rawls believes that the best conception
of a just society is one in which the rules governing that
society are rules that would be chosen by individuals from
behind a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance is a
hypothetical situation in which individuals do not know any
particular details about themselves, such as their sex, age,
race, intelligence, abilities, etc. However, these individuals
do know general facts about human society, such as facts about
psychology, economics, human motivation, etc. Rawls has his
imagined contractors be largely self-interested; each person's
goal is to select the rules that will benefit them the most.
Since they do not know who exactly they are, they will not
choose rules that benefit any one individual, or segment of
society, over another (since they may find themselves to be in
the harmed group). Instead, they will choose rules that
protect, first and foremost, rational, autonomous
individuals.
Although Rawls argues for this conception as a conception
of justice, others have tried to extend it to cover all of
morality. For example, in The Animals Issue, Peter
Carruthers argues for a conception of morality that is based
largely on Rawls's work. Carruthers notes that if we do so
extend Rawls's conception, animals will have no direct moral
standing. Since the contractors are self-interested, but do
not know who they are, they will accept rules that protect
rational individuals. However, the contractors know enough
about themselves to know that they are not animals. They will
not adopt rules that give special protection to animals,
therefore, since this would not further their self-interest.
The result is that rational human beings will be directly
protected, while animals will not.
e. Implications for the Treatment of
Animals
If indirect theories are correct, then we are not required
to take the interests of animals to be directly relevant to
the assessment of our actions when we are deciding how to act.
This does not mean, however, that we are not required to
consider how our actions will affect animals at all. Just
because something is not directly morally considerable does
not imply that we can do whatever we want to it. For example,
there are two straightforward ways in which restrictions
regarding the proper treatment of animals can come into
existence. Consider the duties we have towards private
property. I cannot destroy your car if I desire to do so
because it is your property, and by harming it I will thereby
harm you. Also, I cannot go to the town square and destroy an
old tree for fun since this may upset many people that care
for the tree.
Likewise, duties with regard to animals can exist for these
reasons. I cannot harm your pets because they belong to you,
and by harming them I will thereby harm you. I also cannot
harm animals in public simply for fun since doing so will
upset many people, and I have a duty to not cause people undue
distress. These are two straightforward ways in which indirect
theories will generate duties with regard to animals.
There are two other ways that even stronger restrictions
regarding the proper treatment of animals might be generated
from indirect theories. First, both Immanuel Kant and Peter
Carruthers argue that there can be more extensive indirect
duties to animals. These duties extend not simply to the duty
to refrain from harming the property of others and the duty to
not offend animal lovers. Rather, we also have a duty to
refrain from being cruel to them. Kant argues:
Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties
towards humanity. Animal nature has analogies to human nature,
and by doing our duties to animals in respect of
manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty to
humanity…. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of
animals (Regan and Singer, 1989: 23-24).
Likewise, Carruthers writes:
Such acts [as torturing a cat for fun] are wrong because
they are cruel. They betray an indifference to suffering that
may manifest itself…with that person's dealings with other
rational agents. So although the action may not infringe any
rights…it remains wrong independently of its effect on any
animal lover (Carruthers, 1992: 153-54).
So although we need not consider how our actions affect
animals themselves, we do need to consider how our treatment
of animals will affect our treatment of other human beings. If
being cruel to an animal will make us more likely to be cruel
to other human beings, we ought not be cruel to animals; if
being grateful to animal will help us in being grateful to
human beings then we ought to be grateful to animals.
Second, there may be an argument for vegetarianism that
does not rely on considerations of the welfare of animals at
all. Consider that for every pound of protein that we get from
an animal source, we must feed the animals, on average,
twenty-three pounds of vegetable protein. Many people on the
planet today are dying of easily treatable diseases largely
due to a diet that is below starvation levels. If it is
possible to demonstrate that we have a duty to help alleviate
the suffering of these human beings, then one possible way of
achieving this duty is by refraining from eating meat. The
vegetable protein that is used to feed the animals that
wealthy countries eat could instead be used to feed the human
beings that live in such deplorable conditions.
Of course, not all indirect theorists accept these results.
However, the point to be stressed here is that even granting
that animals have no direct moral status, we may have
(possibly demanding) duties regarding their
treatment.
f. Two Common Arguments Against Indirect
Theories
Two common arguments against indirect theories have seemed
compelling to many people. The first argument is The Argument
from Marginal Cases; the second is an argument against the
Kantian account of indirect duties to animals.
i. The Argument From
Marginal Cases
The Argument from Marginal Cases is an argument that
attempts to demonstrate that if animals do not have direct
moral status, then neither do such human beings as infants,
the senile, the severely cognitively disabled, and other such
"marginal cases" of humanity. Since we believe that these
sorts of human beings do have direct moral status, there must
be something wrong with any theory that claims they do not.
More formally, the argument is structured as follows:
(1) If we are justified in denying direct moral status to
animals then we are justified in denying direct moral status
to the marginal cases.
(2) We are not justified in denying direct moral status to
the marginal cases.
(3) Therefore we are not justified denying direct moral
status to animals.
The defense of premise (1) usually goes something like
this. If being rational (or autonomous, or able to speak) is
what permits us to deny direct moral status to animals, then
we can likewise deny that status to any human that is not
rational (or autonomous, able to speak, etc.). This line of
reasoning works for almost every property that has been
thought to warrant our denying direct moral status to animals.
Since the marginal cases are beings whose abilities are equal
to, if not less than, the abilities of animals, any reason to
keep animals out of the class of beings with direct moral
status will keep the marginal cases out as well.
There is one property that is immune to this line of
argument, namely, the property of being human. Some who adhere
to Worldview/Religious Views might reject this argument and
maintain instead that it is simply "natural" for human beings
to be above animals on any moral scale. However, if someone
does so they must give up the claim that human beings are
above animals due to the fact that human beings are more
intelligent or rational than animals. It must be claimed
instead that being human is, in itself, a morally relevant
property. Few in recent times are willing to make that kind of
a claim.
Another way to escape this line of argument is to deny the
second premise (Cf. Frey, 1980; Francis and Norman, 1978).
This may be done in a series of steps. First, it may be noted
that there are very few human beings that are truly marginal.
For example, infants, although not currently rational, have
the potential to become rational. Perhaps they should not be
counted as marginal for that reason. Likewise, the senile may
have a direct moral status due to the desires they had when
they were younger and rational. Once the actual number of
marginal cases is appreciated, it is then claimed that it is
not counter-intuitive to conclude that the remaining
individuals do not have a direct moral status after all. Once
again, however, few are willing to accept that conclusion. The
fact that a severely cognitively disabled infant can feel pain
seems to most to be a reason to refrain from harming the
infant.<
ii. Problems with Indirect Duties to
Animals
Another argument against indirect theories begins with the
intuition that there are some things that simply cannot be
done to animals. For example, I am not permitted to torture my
own cat for fun, even if no one else finds out about it. This
intuition is one that any acceptable moral theory must be able
to accommodate. The argument against indirect theories is that
they cannot accommodate this intuition in a satisfying
way.
Both Kant and Carruthers agree that my torturing my own cat
for fun would be wrong. However, they believe it is wrong not
because of the harm to the cat, but rather because of the
effect this act will have on me. Many people have found this
to be a very unsatisfying account of the duty. Robert Nozick
labels the bad effects of such an act moral spillover,
and asks:
Why should there be such a spillover? If it is, in
itself, perfectly all right to do anything at all to animals
for any reason whatsoever, then provided a person realizes the
clear line between animals and persons and keeps it in mind as
he acts, why should killing animals brutalize him and make him
more likely to harm or kill persons (Nozick, 1974:
36)?
In other words, unless it is wrong in itself to harm the
animal, it is hard to see why such an act would lead people to
do other acts that are likewise wrong. If the indirect
theorist does not have a better explanation for why it is
wrong to torture a cat for fun, and as long as we firmly
believe such actions are wrong, then we will be forced to
admit that indirect theories are not acceptable.
Indirect theorists can, and have, responded to this line of
argument in three ways. First, they could reject the claim
that the indirect theorist's explanation of the duty is
unsatisfactory. Second, they could offer an alternative
explanation for why such actions as torturing a cat are wrong.
Third, they could reject the claim that those sorts of acts
are necessarily wrong.
2. Direct but Unequal Theories
Most people accept an account of the proper moral status of
animals according to which the interests of animals count
directly in the assessment of actions that affect them, but do
not count for as much as the interests of human beings. Their
defense requires two parts: a defense of the claim that the
interests of animals count directly in the assessment of
actions that affect them, and a defense of the claim that the
interests of animals do not count for as much as the interests
of human beings.
a. Why Animals have Direct Moral
Status
The argument in support of the claim that animals have
direct moral status is rather simple. It goes as follows:
1.) If a being is sentient then it has direct moral
status.
2.) (Most) animals are sentient
3.) Therefore (most) animals have direct moral
status.
"Sentience" refers to the capacity to experience episodes
of positively or negatively valenced awareness. Examples of
positively valenced episodes of awareness are pleasure, joy,
elation, and contentment. Examples of negatively valenced
episodes of awareness are pain, suffering, depression, and
anxiety.
In support of premise (1), many argue that pain and
pleasure are directly morally relevant, and that there is no
reason to discount completely the pleasure or pain of any
being. The argument from analogy is often used in support of
premise (2) (see the discussion of this argument in section I,
part C above). The argument from analogy is also used in
answering the difficult question of exactly which animals are
sentient. The general idea is that the justification for
attributing sentience to a being grows stronger the more
analogous it is to human beings.
People also commonly use the flaws of indirect theories as
a reason to support the claim that animals have direct moral
status. Those that believe both that the marginal cases have
direct moral status and that indirect theories cannot answer
the challenge of the Argument from Marginal Cases are led to
support direct theories; those that believe both that such
actions as the torture of one's own cat for fun are wrong and
that indirect theories cannot explain why they are wrong are
also led to direct theories.
b. Why Animals are not Equal to Human
Beings
The usual manner of justifying the claim that animals are
not equal to human beings is to point out that only humans
have some property, and then argue that that property is what
confers a full and equal moral status to human beings. Some
philosophers have used the following claims on this strategy:
(1) only human beings have rights; (2) only human beings are
rational, autonomous, and self-conscious; (3) only human
beings are able to act morally; and (4) only human beings are
part of the moral community.
i. Only Human Beings Have
Rights
On one common understanding of rights, only human beings
have rights. On this conception of rights, if a being has a
right then others have a duty to refrain from infringing that
right; rights entail duties. An individual that has a right to
something must be able to claim that thing for himself, where
this entails being able to represent himself in his pursuit of
the thing as a being that is legitimately pursuing the
furtherance of his interests (Cf. McCloskey, 1979). Since
animals are not capable of representing themselves in this
way, they cannot have rights.
However, lacking rights does not entail lacking direct
moral status; although rights entail duties it does not follow
that duties entail rights. So although animals may have no
rights, we may still have duties to them. The significance of
having a right, however, is that rights act as "trumps"
against the pursuit of utility. In other words, if an
individual has a right to something, we are not permitted to
infringe on that right simply because doing so will have
better overall results. Our duties to those without rights can
be trumped by considerations of the overall good. Although I
have a duty to refrain from destroying your property, that
duty can be trumped if I must destroy the property in order to
save a life. Likewise, I am not permitted to harm animals
without good reason; however, if greater overall results will
come about from such harm, then it is justified to harm
animals. This sort of reasoning has been used to justify such
practices as experimentation that uses animals, raising
animals for food, and using animals for our entertainment in
such places as rodeos and zoos.
There are two points of contention with the above account
of rights. First, it has been claimed that if human beings
have rights, then animals will likewise have rights. For
example, Joel Feinberg has argued that all is required in
order for a being to have a right is that the being be capable
of being represented as legitimately pursuing the furtherance
of its interests (Feinberg, 1974). The claim that the being
must be able to represent itself is too strong, thinks
Feinberg, for such a requirement will exclude infants, the
senile, and other marginal cases from the class of beings with
rights. In other words, Feinberg invokes yet another instance
of the Argument from Marginal Cases in order to support his
position.
Second, it has been claimed that the very idea of rights
needs to be jettisoned. There are two reasons for this. First,
philosophers such as R. G. Frey have questioned the legitimacy
of the very idea of rights, echoing Bentham's famous claim
that rights are "nonsense on stilts" (Frey, 1980). Second,
philosophers have argued that whether or not a being will have
rights will depend essentially on whether or not it has some
other lower-order property. For example, on the above
conception of rights, whether a being will have a right or not
will depend on whether it is able to represent itself as a
being that is legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its
interests. If that is what grounds rights, then what is needed
is a discussion of the moral importance of that ability, along
with a defense of the claim that it is an ability that animals
lack. More generally, it has been argued that if we wish to
deny animals rights and claim that only human beings have
them, then we must focus not so much on rights, but rather on
what grounds them. For this reason, much of the recent
literature concerning animals and ethics focuses not so much
on rights, but rather on whether or not animals have certain
other properties, and whether the possession of those
properties is a necessary condition for equal consideration
(Cf. DeGrazia, 1999).
ii. Only Human Beings are
Rational, Autonomous, and Self-Conscious
Some people argue that only rational, autonomous, and
self-conscious beings deserve full and equal moral status;
since only human beings are rational, autonomous, and
self-conscious, it follows that only human beings deserve full
and equal moral status. Once again, it is not claimed that we
can do whatever we like to animals; rather, the fact that
animals are sentient gives us reason to avoid causing them
unnecessary pain and suffering. However, when the interests of
animals and human beings conflict we are required to give
greater weight to the interests of human beings. This also has
been used to justify such practices as experimentation on
animals, raising animals for food, and using animals in such
places as zoos and rodeos.
The attributes of rationality, autonomy, and
self-consciousness confer a full and equal moral status to
those that possess them because these beings are the only ones
capable of attaining certain values and goods; these values
and goods are of a kind that outweigh the kinds of values and
goods that non-rational, non-autonomous, and
non-self-conscious beings are capable of attaining. For
example, in order to achieve the kind of dignity and
self-respect that human beings have, a being must be able to
conceive of itself as one among many, and must be able to
choose his actions rather than be led by blind instinct (Cf.
Francis and Norman, 1978; Steinbock, 1978). Furthermore, the
values of appreciating art, literature, and the goods that
come with deep personal relationships all require one to be
rational, autonomous, and self-conscious. These values, and
others like them, are the highest values to us; they are what
make our lives worth living. As John Stuart Mill wrote, "Few
human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the
lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a
beast's pleasures" (Mill, 1979). We find the lives of beings
that can experience these goods to be more valuable, and hence
deserving of more protection, than the lives of beings that
cannot.
iii. Only
Human Beings Can Act Morally
Another reason for giving stronger preference to the
interests of human beings is that only human beings can act
morally. This is considered to be important because beings
that can act morally are required to sacrifice their interests
for the sake of others. It follows that those that do
sacrifice their good for the sake of others are owed greater
concern from those that benefit from such sacrifices. Since
animals cannot act morally, they will not sacrifice their own
good for the sake of others, but will rather pursue their good
even at the expense of others. That is why human beings should
give the interests of other human beings greater weight than
they do the interests of animals.
iv. Only
Human Beings are Part of the Moral Community
Only Human Beings are Part of the Moral Community
Finally, some claim that membership in the moral community
is necessary for full and equal moral status. The moral
community is not defined in terms of the intrinsic properties
that beings have, but is defined rather in terms of the
important social relations that exist between beings. For
example, human beings can communicate with each other in
meaningful ways, can engage in economic, political, and
familial relationships with each other, and can also develop
deep personal relationships with each other. These kinds of
relationships require the members of such relationships to
extend greater concern to other members of these relationships
than they do to others in order for the relationships to
continue. Since these relationships are what constitute our
lives and the value contained in them, we are required to give
greater weight to the interests of human beings than we do to
animals.
3. Moral Equality Theories
The final theories to discuss are the moral equality
theories. On these theories, not only do animals have direct
moral status, but they also have the same moral status as
human beings. According to theorists of this kind, there can
be no legitimate reason to place human beings and animals in
different moral categories, and so whatever grounds our duties
to human beings will likewise ground duties to
animals.
a. Singer and the Principle of Equal Consideration
of Interests
Peter Singer has been very influential in the debate
concerning animals and ethics. The publication of his
Animal Liberation marked the beginning of a growing and
increasingly powerful movement in both the United States and
Europe.
Singer attacks the views of those who wish to give the
interests of animals less weight than the interests of human
beings. He argues that if we attempt to extend such unequal
consideration to the interests of animals, we will be forced
to give unequal consideration to the interests of different
human beings. However, doing this goes against the intuitively
plausible and commonly accepted claim that all human beings
are equal. Singer concludes that we must instead extend a
principle of equal consideration of interests to animals as
well. Singer describes that principle as follows:
The essence of the Principle of Equal Consideration of
Interests is that we give equal weight in our moral
deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by
our actions (Singer, 1993: 21).
Singer defends this principle with two arguments. The first
is a version of the Argument from Marginal Cases; the second
is the Sophisticated Inegalitarian Argument.
i. The Argument from
Marginal Cases (Again)
Singer's version of the Argument from Marginal Cases is
slightly different from the version listed above. It runs as
follows:
(1) In order to conclude that all and only human beings
deserve a full and equal moral status (and therefore that no
animals deserve a full and equal moral status), there must be
some property P that all and only human beings have
that can ground such a claim.
(2) Any P that only human beings have is a property
that (some) human beings lack (e.g., the marginal cases).
(3) Any P that all human beings have is a property
that (most) animals have as well.
(4) Therefore, there is no way to defend the claim that all
and only human beings deserve a full and equal moral
status.
Singer does not defend his first premise, but does not need
to; the proponents of the view that all and only humans
deserve a full and equal moral status rely on it themselves
(see the discussion of Direct but Unequal Theories above). In
support of the second premise, Singer asks us to consider
exactly what properties only humans have that can ground such
a strong moral status. Certain properties, such as being
human, having human DNA, or walking upright do not seem to be
the kind of properties that can ground this kind of status.
For example, if we were to encounter alien life forms that did
not have human DNA, but lived lives much like our own, we
would not be justified in according these beings a weaker
moral status simply because they were not human.
However, there are some properties which only human beings
have which have seemed to many to be able to ground a full and
equal moral status; for example, being rational, autonomous,
or able to act morally have all been used to justify giving a
stronger status to human beings than we do to animals. The
problem with such a suggestion is that not all human beings
have these properties. So if this is what grounds a full and
equal moral status, it follows that not all human beings are
equal after all.
If we try to ensure that we choose a property that all
human beings do have that will be sufficient to ground a full
and equal moral status, we seemed to be pushed towards
choosing something such as being sentient, or being capable of
experiencing pleasure and pain. Since the marginal cases have
this property, they would be granted a full and equal moral
status on this suggestion. However, if we choose a property of
this kind, animals will likewise have a full and equal moral
status since they too are sentient.
The attempt to grant all and only human beings a full and
equal moral status does not work according to Singer. We must
either conclude that not all human beings are equal, or we
must conclude that not only human beings are equal. Singer
suggests that the first option is too counter-intuitive to be
acceptable; so we are forced to conclude that all animals are
equal, human or otherwise.
ii. The Sophisticated
Inegalitarian Argument
Another argument Singer employs to refute the claim that
all and only human beings deserve a full and equal moral
status focuses on the supposed moral relevance of such
properties as rationality, autonomy, the ability to act
morally, etc. Singer argues that if we were to rely on these
sorts of properties as the basis of determining moral status,
then we would justify a kind of discrimination against certain
human beings that is structurally analogous to such practices
as racism and sexism.
For example, the racist believes that all members of his
race are more intelligent and rational than all of the members
of other races, and thus assigns a greater moral status to the
members of his race than he does do the members of other
races. However, the racist is wrong in this factual judgment;
it is not true that all members of any one race are smarter
than all members of any other. Notice, however, that the
mistake the racist is making is merely a factual mistake. His
moral principle that assigns moral status on the basis of
intelligence or rationality is not what has led him astray.
Rather, it is simply his assessment of how intelligence or
rationality is distributed among human beings that is
mistaken.
If that were all that is wrong with racism and sexism, then
a moral theory according to which we give extra consideration
to the very smart and rational would be justified. In other
words, we would be justified in becoming, not racists, but
sophisticated inegalitarians. However, the sophisticated
inegalitarian is just as morally suspect as the racist is.
Therefore, it follows that the racist is not morally
objectionable merely because of his views on how rationality
and intelligence are distributed among human beings; rather he
is morally objectionable because of the basis he uses to weigh
the interests of different individuals. How intelligent,
rational, etc., a being is cannot be the basis of his moral
status; if it were, then the sophisticated inegalitarian would
be on secure ground.
Notice that in order for this argument to succeed, it must
target properties that admit of degrees. If someone argued
that the basis of human equality rested on the possession of a
property that did not admit of degrees, it would not follow
that some human beings have that property to a stronger degree
than others, and the sophisticated inegalitarian would not be
justified. However, most of the properties that are used in
order to support the claim that all and only human beings
deserve a full and equal moral status are properties that do
admit of degrees. Such properties as being human or having
human DNA do not admit of degrees, but, as already mentioned,
these properties do not seem to be capable of supporting such
a moral status.
iii. Practical Implications
In order to implement the Principle of Equal Consideration
of Interests in the practical sphere, we must be able to
determine the interests of the beings that will be affected by
our actions, and we must give similar interests similar
weight. Singer concludes that animals can experience pain and
suffering by relying on the argument from analogy (see the
discussion of Cartesian Theories above). Since animals can
experience pain and suffering, they have an interest in
avoiding pain.
These facts require the immediate end to many of our
practices according to Singer. For example, animals that are
raised for food in factory farms live lives that are full of
unimaginable pain and suffering (Singer devotes an entire
chapter of his book to documenting these facts. He relies
mainly on magazines published by the factory farm business for
these facts). Although human beings do satisfy their interests
by eating meat, Singer argues that the interests the animals
have in avoiding this unimaginable pain and suffering is
greater than the interests we have in eating food that tastes
good. If we are to apply the Principle of Equal Consideration
of Interests, we will be forced to cease raising animals in
factory farms for food. A failure to do so is nothing other
than speciesism, or giving preference to the interests of our
own species merely because of they are of our species.
Singer does not unequivocally claim that we must not eat
animals if we are to correctly apply the Principle of Equal
Consideration of Interests. Whether we are required to refrain
from painlessly killing animals will depend on whether animals
have an interest in continuing to exist in the future. In
order to have this interest, Singer believes that a being must
be able to conceive of itself as existing into the future, and
this requires a being to be self-conscious. Non-self-conscious
beings are not harmed by their deaths, according to Singer,
for they do not have an interest in continuing to exist into
the future.
Singer argues that we might be able to justify killing
these sorts of beings with The Replaceability Argument. On
this line of thought, if we kill a non-self-conscious being
that was living a good life, then we have lessened the overall
amount of good in the world. This can be made up, however, by
bringing another being into existence that can experience
similar goods. In other words, non-self-conscious beings are
replaceable: killing one can be justified if doing so is
necessary to bring about the existence of another. Since the
animals we rear for food would not exist if we did not eat
them, it follows that killing these animals can be justified
if the animals we rear for food live good lives. However, in
order for this line of argumentation to justify killing
animals, the animals must not only be non-self-conscious, but
they must also live lives that are worth living, and their
deaths must be painless. Singer expresses doubts that all of
these conditions could be met, and unequivocally claims that
they are not met by such places as factory farms.
Singer also condemns most experimentation in which animals
are used. He first points out that many of the experiments
performed using animal subjects do not have benefits for human
beings that would outweigh the pain caused to the animals. For
example, experiments used to test cosmetics or other
non-necessary products for human beings cannot be justified if
we use the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests.
Singer also condemns experiments that are aimed at preventing
or curing human diseases. If we are prepared to use animal
subjects for such experiments, then it would actually be
better from a scientific point of view to use human subjects
instead, for there would be no question of cross-species
comparisons when interpreting the data. If we believe the
benefits outweigh the harms, then instead of using animals we
should instead use orphaned infants that are severely
cognitively disabled. If we believe that such a suggestion is
morally repugnant when human beings are to be used, but
morally innocuous when animals are to be used, then we are
guilty of speciesism.
Likewise, hunting for sport, using animals in rodeos,
keeping animals confined in zoos wherein they are not able to
engage in their natural activities are all condemned by the
use of the Principle of the Equal Consideration of
Interests.
b. Regan and Animal Rights
Tom Regan's seminal work, The Case for Animal
Rights, is one of the most influential works on the topic
of animals and ethics. Regan argues for the claim that animals
have rights in just the same way that human beings do. Regan
believes it is a mistake to claim that animals have an
indirect moral status or an unequal status, and to then infer
that animals cannot have any rights. He also thinks it is a
mistake to ground an equal moral status on Utilitarian
grounds, as Singer attempts to do. According to Regan, we must
conclude that animals have the same moral status as human
beings; furthermore, that moral status is grounded on rights,
not on Utilitarian principles.
Regan argues for his case by relying on the concept of
inherent value. According to Regan, any being that is a
subject-of-a-life is a being that has inherent value. A being
that has inherent value is a being towards which we must show
respect; in order to show respect to such a being, we cannot
use it merely as a means to our ends. Instead, each such being
must be treated as an end in itself. In other words, a being
with inherent value has rights, and these rights act as trumps
against the promotion of the overall good.
Regan relies on a version of the Argument from Marginal
Cases in arguing for this conclusion. He begins by asking what
grounds human rights. He rejects robust views that claim that
a being must be capable of representing itself as legitimately
pursuing the furtherance of its interests on the grounds that
this conception of rights implies that the marginal cases of
humanity do not have rights. However, since we think that
these beings do have moral rights there must be some other
property that grounds these rights. According to Regan, the
only property that is common to both normal adult human beings
and the marginal cases is the property of being a
subject-of-a-life. A being that is a subject-of-a-life
will:
have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense
of the future, including their own future; an emotional life
together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and
welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit
of their desires and goals; a psychological identity over
time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their
experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically
independently of their utility for others, and logically
independently of their being the object of anyone else's
interests (Regan, 1983: 243).
This property is one that all of the human beings that we
think deserve rights have; however, it is a property that many
animals (especially mammals) have as well. So if these
marginal cases of humanity deserve rights, then so do these
animals.
Although this position may seem quite similar to Singer's
position (see section III, part A above), Regan is careful to
point to what he perceives to be the flaws of Singer's
Utilitarian theory. According to Singer, we are required to
count every similar interest equally in our deliberation.
However, by doing this we are focusing on the wrong thing,
Regan claims. What matters is the individual that has the
interest, not the interest itself. By focusing on interests
themselves, Utilitarianism will license the most horrendous
actions. For example, if it were possible to satisfy more
interests by performing experiments on human beings, then that
is what we should do on Utilitarian grounds. However, Regan
believes this is clearly unacceptable: any being with inherent
value cannot be used merely as a means.
This does not mean that Regan takes rights to be absolute.
When the rights of different individuals conflict, then
someone's rights must be overriden. Regan argues that in these
sorts of cases we must try to minimize the rights that are
overriden. However, we are not permitted to override someone's
rights just because doing so will make everyone better off; in
this kind of case we are sacrificing rights for utility, which
is never permissible on Regan's view.
Given these considerations, Regan concludes that we must
radically alter the ways in which we treat animals. When we
raise animals for food, regardless of how they are treated and
how they are killed, we are using them as a means to our ends
and not treating them as ends in themselves. Thus, we may not
raise animals for food. Likewise, when we experiment on
animals in order to advance human science, we are using
animals merely as a means to our ends. Similar thoughts apply
to the use of animals in rodeos and the hunting of
animals.
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